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THE PREDICTIVE UTILITY OF GENERALIZED EXPECTED 
UTILITY THEORIES 
BY DAVID W. HARLESS AND COLIN F. CAMERER' 
Many alternative theories have been proposed to explain violations of expected utility 
(EU) theory observed in experiments. Several recent studies test some of these alternative 
theories against each other. Formal tests used to judge the theories usually count the 
number of responses consistent with the theory, ignoring systematic variation in responses 
that are inconsistent. We develop a maximum-likelihood estimation method which uses 
all the information in the data, creates test statistics that can be aggregated across studies, 
and enables one to judge the predictive utility-the fit and parsimony-of utility theories. 
Analyses of 23 data sets, using several thousand choices, suggest a menu of theories which 
sacrifice the least parsimony for the biggest improvement in fit. The menu is: mixed 
fanning, prospect theory, EU, and expected value. Which theories are best is highly 
sensitive to whether gambles in a pair have the same support (EU fits better) or not (EU 
fits poorly). Our method may have application to other domains in which various theories 
predict different subsets of choices (e.g., refinements of Nash equilibrium in noncoopera- 
tive games). 
KEYWORDS: Expected utility theory, non-expected utility theory, prospect theory, 
model selection, Allais paradox. 
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EMPIRICAL ACCURACY of expected utility (EU) 
theory has led many theorists to develop generalizations of EU. The develop- 
ment of alternatives to EU, in turn, has led to a vigorous new round of 
experiments testing the empirical validity of the new theories against each other 
and against EU (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990), Camerer (1989,1992), 
Chew and Waller (1986), Conlisk (1989), Harless (1992), Prelec (1990), Sopher 
and Gigliotti (1990), Starmer and Sugden (1989)). The experiments test robust- 
ness of previously observed EU violations (Allais (1953), Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)) and test the accuracy of predictions in new domains. 
The recent studies are informative and useful-for example, recent results 
have already guided development of some new theories2 -but there is still 
substantial confusion about what the new studies say. For example, the Chew 
and Waller (1986) data have been cited as supporting weighted EU theory (by 
Chew and Waller), as supporting the "fanning out" hypothesis (by Machina 
(1987)), and as supporting a mixture of fanning out and "fanning in" (by Conlisk 
(1989)). 
In this paper we show that confusion about the results of the new studies can 
be largely resolved by more powerful statistical tests. Our paper makes three 
contributions: We present new tests, which gain power by using all the informa- 
tion available in patterns of observed choices (most earlier tests threw away 
1 Thanks to John Conlisk, Dave Grether, Bill Neilson, Nat Wilcox, and a co-editor and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments, to Drazen Prelec and John Kagel for supplying their 
data, and especially to Teck-Hua Ho for collaboration in the project's early stages. Camerer's work 
was supported by NSF Grant SES-90-23531 and by the Russell Sage Foundation, where he visited 
during the 1991-1992 academic year. 
2 See Neilson (1992a, 1992b), Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991). 
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some important information); the test statistics we derive can be added across 
studies, enabling us to aggregate data (nearly 8,000 choices) and increasing 
power further; and we give a method for trading off fit and parsimony of various 
theories. Hence, our work explores the predictive utility-fit and parsimony-of 
various utility theories. 
The result is a menu of theories. Researchers can pick a theory from the 
menu, depending on the price they are willing to pay (in poorer fit) for added 
parsimony. Aggregating across all studies, the menu is: mixed fanning, prospect 
theory, EU, and expected value (EV); but the results are sensitive to the domain 
of gambles. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section illustrates our method, and 
predictions of several generalized EU theories, with one study. Section 2 
reviews the results from several choice studies. Section 3 aggregates the results 
from 23 data sets and 2,000 choice patterns, and describes a method for trading 
off fit and parsimony. In Section 4 we draw conclusions. 
1. ILLUSTRATION OF OUR MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 
The study by Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul (1990), one of several we include 
in our analyses, will illustrate our method and the predictions of several 
generalized utility theories. In one part of their study, subjects chose one lottery 
(or expressed indifference) out of each of three pairs. Each pair consisted of one 
lottery, denoted S for "safer," and a mean-preserving spread of S, denoted R 
for "riskier." The pairs were: 
Pair 1: S1 = (-$20,.6;-$12,.4) Rl = (-$20,.84;$0,.16) 
Pair 2: S2 = (-$12) R2 = (-$20,.6; $0,.4) 
Pair 3: S3 = (-$12, .2; $0, .8) R3 = (-$20, .12; $0, .88) 
Figure 1 shows the three pairs in a unit triangle diagram (Marschak (1950), 






S2 Si P(-$20) 
FIGURE 1.-Unit triangle example. 
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TABLE I 
CONSISTENT PArTERNS FOR BArTALIO, KAGEL, AND JIRANYAKUL REAL LOSSES 
Pattern Observed Fan Fan RD-cave RD-cave RD-vex RD-vex 
123 Frequency EU Out In MF gIE f DE gDE f IE PT 
ssS 7 X X X X X X X X 
SSR 1 X X X X X 
SRS 1 X X 
SRR 1 X X X X X 
RSS 3 X X X X X 
RSR 0 X X X 
RRS 8 X X X X X X 
RRR 7 X X X X X X X X X 
p(- $20) and p(O) axes. Notice that the pairs are related in a particular 
geometric way: The lines connecting the lotteries in each pair are parallel. 
Furthermore, two of the pairs have a common ratio of outcome probabilities- 
for example, p(- $12)/p(- $20) equals 1/.6 = 5/3 in pair 2, and .2/.12 = 5/3 
in pair 3. The two pairs form a "common ratio" problem. (In pair 1, the ratio of 
the differences in outcome probabilities between lotteries, (.4 - 0)/(.84 - .6), 
has the ratio 5/3 too.) 
Most choice theories do not predict precisely whether people will pick S or R 
in each pair. Instead, theories restrict patterns of choices across pairs. For 
example, a person who obeys EU judges gambles by the expectation of the 
utilities of their outcomes. Thus, a person who obeys EU and prefers S2 to R2 
(denoted S2 >- R2) reveals that u(- $12)> .6u(- $20) (setting u($0) = 0 for 
simplicity). But u(- $12) > .6u(- $20) implies .2u(- $12) > .12u(- $20), which 
predicts S3 >- R3. By a similar calculation, Si >- Ri. EU therefore predicts that 
people who choose S in one pair will choose S in the other pairs too, so EU 
allows the pattern denoted SSS-the choice of Si, S2, and S3. Alternatively, 
an EU-maximizer with R2 >- S2 must prefer Ri and R3 to Si and S3, so EU 
allows the pattern RRR, but not the other six possible patterns. 
The patterns allowed by each theory in the BKJ study are shown in Table I 
(marked by X's). We review the predictions of each theory briefly. Much more 
detail is available in Machina (1982, 1987), Fishburn (1988), and Camerer 
(1989,1992). 
EU: As described above, EU predicts patterns SSS or RRR in Table I. 
Graphically, EU requires the indifference curves that connect sets of equally- 
preferred gambles to be parallel straight lines. That implies preference for the S 
lottery in each pair, or the R lottery in each pair. 
Fanning out: Machina (1982) proposed a generalization of EU in which 
Frechet differentiability of a preference functional guaranteed that similar 
lotteries could be approximately ranked by the EU of a "local" utility function. 
(In EU, the local utility functions are all the same.) He also suggested that many 
violations of EU could be explained by the hypothesis that as the lotteries being 
ranked become better (in the sense of stochastically-dominating improvements), 
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local utility functions become more concave (reflecting greater local risk-aver- 
sion). Graphically, Machina's hypothesis implies that indifference curves "fan 
out:" curves become steeper as one moves in the direction of increasing 
preference, from the lower right hand corner to the upper left hand corner. 
Besides the EU-conforming patterns SSS and RRR, fanning out allows any 
patterns in which preferences switch from R to S from pairs 1 to 3, viz., 
patterns RSS and RRS. 
Fanning in: The opposite of fanning out is "fanning in," the tendency of 
indifference curves to become flatter, not steeper, in the direction of increasing 
preference. There is little a priori evidence suggesting fanning in, but we 
consider it for completeness. Fanning in allows patterns SSR and SRR (along 
with the EU patterns). 
Mixed fan (MF): There is some evidence that indifference curves fan out for 
less favorable lotteries (like pair 1) and fan in for more favorable ones (like pair 
3), suggesting a hybrid "mixed fan" hypothesis (cf. Neilson (1992a)) in which the 
direction of fanning switches within a triangle diagram. The point at which 
fanning switches from out to in (moving to the northwest) might lie outside the 
space of choices, so both fanning out patterns and fanning in patterns are 
consistent with MF. Mixed fanning also allows a pattern that neither fanning 
out nor fanning in allows, viz., fanning out between pairs 1 and 2, and fanning in 
between pairs 2 and 3, the pattern RSR. The only pattern which is excluded is 
SRS. 
EU with rank-dependent weights (RD): There are several generalizations of 
EU in which outcome utilities are weighted "rank-dependently" or "cumula- 
tively" (Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987), Chew, Karni, and Safra (1987), Green and 
Jullien (1988), Segal (1987,1989), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). In most of 
these theories, a decumulative distribution function (one minus the cumulative 
distribution function) is transformed by a continuous, monotonic function g(p), 
with g(O) = 0 and g(l) = 1; outcomes are weighted by differences or differen- 
tials of the transformed decumulative. If g(p) is convex then high-ranked 
outcomes are underweighted and unit triangle indifference curves are concave 
(denoted RD-cave); curves also fan out along the base of the triangle, and fan in 
along the left side. If g(p) is concave then high-ranked outcomes are over- 
weighted and indifference curves are convex (denoted RD-vex); curves fan in 
along the base of the triangle, and fan out along the left side. If g(p) =p then 
each outcome is simply weighted by its probability, as in EU. 
RD theories do not make precise predictions about choices in the BKJ study 
unless further restrictions are placed on the shape of g(p). Segal (1987) showed 
that if g(p) is convex (indifference curves are concave) and has increasing 
elasticity (i.e., pg'(p)/g(p) is increasing in p) then indifference curves will 
exhibit a common ratio effect: fanning out in the southeast portion of the 
triangle (SSx, RRx, RSx allowed; SRx not allowed). We denote predictions 
when indifference curves are concave (and g(p) is convex with increasing 
elasticity) as RD-cave gIE. The theory makes different predictions when 
indifference curves are convex and g(p) is concave (denoted RD-vex) and when 
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cumulative probabilities are weighted instead of decumulatives (denoted by 
labeling the weighting function f rather than g). The predictions of four 
variants of RD with elasticity conditions are shown in Table I. Quiggin's (1982) 
original form of rank-dependent expected utility, called "anticipated utility," 
presumed f(.5). = .5 with f(p) concave below .5(f(p) > p) and convex above 
.5(f(p) <p) (see also Quiggin (1993)). This form excludes no patterns in 8 of 
the 23 studies we consider later, so we say nothing more about it except in 
footnote 23. 
Prospect theory (PT): Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a descriptive 
theory embodying several empirical departures from EU. We test an extremely 
simplified form of prospect theory which incorporates several of its key features: 
The value function, or utility function over riskless amounts, is assumed to have 
a reference point of $0 (i.e., v($0) = 0) and to be strictly concave for gains and 
strictly convex for losses (exhibiting a "reflection effect"); probabilities are 
assumed to be transformed by a decision weight function wr(p);3 and lotteries 
are ranked by the sum of their weighted outcome values.4 
All the predictions we derive based on prospect theory require only reflection 
of the value function and certain general properties of decision weights as 
hypothesized in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The properties of the probabil- 
ity transformation function r(p) we use in making predictions are subcertainty 
(v(p) + r(1 - p) < 1), subproportionality (rr(rp)/rr(rq) > rr(p)/rr(q), for p < q 
and 0 < r < 1), and convexity of v for probabilities above .01, which allows for 
overweighting small probabilities and underweighting larger probabilities (but 
we assume only that the crossover point occurs somewhere between .1 and .3). 
In the BKJ study prospect theory predicts v(S2) = v(- 12) and v(R2) = 
r(.6)v(-20). Convexity of v(x) for losses implies v(-12) < .6v(-20); 
underweighting of high probabilities implies r(.6) < .6. Together they imply 
v(- 12) < r(.6)v(- 20), predicting a preference for R2 over S2. Prospect theory 
also predicts a preference for Rl over Si, but makes no prediction about 
choices in pair 3.5 Here, the theory as we have characterized it allows only the 
two patterns RRS and RRR, so it is just as parsimonious as EU. 
Additional theories: There are many other choice theories besides those 
whose predictions are shown in Table I. We consider some and neglect others. 
The historical predecessor to EU, expected value maximization (EV), predicted 
that people would choose lotteries according to expected value. In some studies, 
3 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) show'how to extend prospect theory in several ways, including 
cumulative weighting as in the rank-dependent theories. 
4 In addition, "irregular lotteries," which have only positive or only negative outcomes, are valued 
by segregating the certain outcome from the uncertain part. 
5S1 chosen over Rl implies (1 - 7r(.6))v(- 12) + 7-(.6)v(-20) > 7-(.84)v(-20); the convexity of 
the value function implies 1 - 7(.6) > (1/.6)(7(.84) - 7T(.6)) which contradicts the assumption that 
7i is convex. Prospect theory makes no prediction about choices in pair 3 because S3 z R3 as 
7(.12);t .67i(.2). Convexity of the value function for losses means PT predicts preference for the 
riskier lottery when lotteries are mean-preserving risk spreads except when the decision weight 
function overweights small probabilities (such as the .12 probability of - $20 in R3). 
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including the BKJ study illustrated by Table I, lotteries in a pair had the same 
expected value. Then we took EV to be identical to EU.6 
If the local utility function in generalized utility is constant along an indiffer- 
ence curve, then "implicit EU" (IEU) results (Dekel (1986), Chew (1989)). IEU 
predicts linear indifference curves, thus satisfying the betweenness axiom, a 
weakened form of independence. (Betweenness requires that a reduced-form 
probability mixture of any two lotteries should not be worse or better than both; 
the mixture should lie between them in preference.) IEU is only tested in 
studies which ask subjects to choose between lotteries in two or more pairs 
which lie on the same line in the triangle diagram. In the BKJ study IEU allows 
any pattern (since no two pairs lie on the same line). 
In "weighted utility" theory (WEU), a special case of IEU, lottery utilities are 
computed by multiplying an outcome's utility by its probability and by a 
normalized weighting function which depends on the outcome (Chew and 
MacCrimmon (1979), Chew (1983), Fishburn (1982,1983)). In all the studies we 
consider, WEU is the same as combining either fanning out and fanning in 
(depending on the shape of the weighting function) with linearity of indifference 
curves; we denote these brands of WEU as WEU-out and WEU-in. In some 
studies, like BKJ, the predictions of WEU-out (WEU-in) are the same as those 
of fanning out (in). 
Combining mixed fanning with linear indifference curves yields a hybrid we 
call "linear mixed fan" (LMF). This theory was suggested by Neilson (1992a). 
Gul's (1991) disappointment-based theory is slightly more restrictive but obser- 
vationally equivalent to LMF in all the studies we review. (However, a special 
study could be designed to separate LMF and Gul's theory.) 
Theories not included in the tables below include lottery-dependent utility 
(Becker and Sarin (1987)), ordinal utility (Green and Jullien (1988)), prospective 
reference theory7 (Viscusi (1989)), combinations of rank-dependent and 
weighted utility (Chew and Epstein (1990)), and the cumulative extension of 
prospect theory proposed recently (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). We address 
some of these theories in the footnotes and Section 3. Others may be easily 
tested using our method after the hard work of determining which choice 
patterns the theories allow is finished. 
6Alternatively, when one gamble is a mean-preserving spread of another, one could interpret EV 
to imply that subjects are indifferent between the gambles in each pair. Under that interpretation, 
each pattern is equally likely (the EV maximizer chooses by flipping a fair coin). Tests of that 
restriction are reported in footnote 27. Another approach allows each indifferent pair to have a 
different choice proportion, then estimate the likelihood-maximizing proportions from the data. 
(The coin-flip approach restricts the proportions to be .5.) But this approach allows EV to fit too 
well: if the choice-proportion parameters are allowed to differ across pairs, EV, so interpreted, may 
"explain" fanning out or fanning in. We could allow other theories (which have EV as a special 
case) the same luxury of extra choice-proportion parameters, but then we quickly run out of degrees 
of freedom in many data sets. 
7 We have not included prospective reference theory in the main analysis because we only study 
experiments with three, four, and five pairwise choices (see footnote 21), and none of these 
experiments adequately tests the predictions of prospective reference theory. For tests of the 
specific predictions of prospective reference theory with two pairwise choices, see Harless (1993). 
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Graphical Comparison of Theories 
A simple, appealing way to judge a theory is to calculate the fraction of 
observed patterns that are consistent with the theory. EU allows the patterns 
SSS and RRR. Table I shows that seven people picked SSS and seven picked 
RRR, so 14 of 28 (50%) chose as predicted by EU. The four patterns allowed by 
fanning out were picked by 25 of 28 subjects (89%). 
An obvious drawback of this method is that theories which allow more 
patterns will always have a higher proportion of consistent choices. A simple 
test which puts theories on more equal footing compares the proportion of 
consistent choices with the proportion of patterns allowed (i.e., the proportion 
of choices that would be consistent if choices were actually made randomly). For 
example, EU patterns capture 50% of the choices, but allow just 2 of 8 possible 
patterns (25%). A z test measures the likelihood of such accurate prediction if 
1 -o 
RD-vex flE (2.6) -0 MF 71 .4 
0.9 Fan Out (4.2)-0 RDave glE (2.2) 
RD-vex gDE (1.8)/ 
0.8 - / 
/ 
0.7 / 
/ *RD-cave fDE (-0.9) 
// 
0.6 -- Fan In (0.8), 
Proportion PT (3.5)-o 







0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of Consistent Patterns 
Z statistics (in parentheses) test each theory against the random choice null hypothesis. 
FIGURE 2.-Battalio, Kagel, and Jinanyakul: Real losses, Series 1. 
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choices were made randomly (e.g., Chew and Waller (1986)). For EU, the z 
statistic is (.50 -.25)/[(.25)(.75)/28)]1/2, or z = 3.1 (p = .001). For fanning out, 
which allows four of eight possible patterns (50%) and explains 89% of the 
choices, z = 4.2(p = 1.3E - 05). 
There are many plausible ways to compare the accuracy of theories (e.g., 
comparing their z statistics). We developed a graphical method of displaying 
accuracy which permits easy ranking of theories by several criteria. Figure 2 
gives an example using the BKJ data. 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of consistent responses (y axis) and the 
number of patterns allowed (x axis), for several theories. The open diamonds 
represent the "data frontier:" the highest possible consistent proportions for 
each number of consistent patterns. For example, the three most common 
patterns, RRS, RRR, and SSS were chosen by 29%, 25%, and 25% of the 
subjects, respectively. The best one-pattern theory would have only 29% consis- 
tent. The best two-pattern theory would have 54% consistent, and so on. (Note 
that the data frontier is always (weakly) concave.) The data frontier therefore 
shows the best a theory can possibly do. Points representing different theories 
must always lie below, the data frontier or lie right on it (as prospect theory, 
fanning out, and RD-vex-f IE do, in Figure 2). The hatched "random choice 
line" represents the proportions consistent that would result if people chose 
randomly. 
A look at Figure 2 suggests some visual ways to judge theories. Good theories 
should be close to the data frontier, and far from the random choice line. The z 
statistic (shown in parentheses in Figure 2) gives a formal measure of how far 
each point is from the random choice line; fanning out does best by that 
criterion (z = 4.2). The difference between the proportion consistent and the 
proportion of patterns allowed, a measure advocated by Selten (1991), is the 
vertical (or horizontal) distance from the random choice line; fanning out does 
best by that criterion also.8 The ratio measure, the proportion of consistent 
choices per pattern, is measured by the slope of the line connecting each theory 
point to the origin; prospect theory is best by that measure (27% per pattern). 
An opposite measure is the proportion of inconsistent choices per inconsistent 
pattern (sometimes called the "outside ratio"), measured by the slope of the 
line connecting each theory point to the upper right corner. A good theory 
makes the outside ratio low; RD-vex-f IE is best by that measure. 
The various criteria reward theories for different kinds of predictive accuracy. 
The ratio statistic (slope from origin) rewards more parsimonious theories which 
capture the most common pattern(s). The outside ratio (slope from upper right 
corner) rewards broader theories which exclude uncommon patterns. 
8The z statistic and the difference measure are closely related because the z statistic is simply 
the difference measure divided by (p(l - p)/n)l/2. Since the number of observed pattern choices n 
is the same for all the theories, compared to the difference measure the z statistic favors theories 
with low and high values of p (i.e., theories that predict very few or very many patterns). 
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Figure 2 shows that many of the generalizations of EU are surprisingly 
parsimonious and accurate. For example, in this study prospect theory predicts 
the same number of patterns as EU (two) but it explains more choices and beats 
EU by all the measures given above. Fanning out permits twice as many 
patterns as EU, but it accounts for nearly twice as many choices (and beats EU 
by the measures except ratio). The graph is useful for screening out dominated 
theories-those which allow the same number of patterns (or more) but have 
fewer consistent responses than other theories. Dominated theories lie to the 
lower right of theories which dominate them. In Figure 2, prospect theory 
dominates EU, fanning out dominates fanning in, RD-vex-gDE and RD-cave- 
f DE, and RD-vex-f IE dominates mixed fan and the other rank-dependent 
theories. 
Note that we use the terms parsimonious in a very specific sense, to denote 
the number of patterns a theory allows. However, the number of patterns a 
theory allows does not necessarily correspond to the number of free parameters 
or free functions it uses. Theories which appear unparsimonious because they 
have many additional free parameters or free functions might, with minimal 
restrictions on those functions, predict relatively few patterns (prospect theory is 
an example). Contrarily, a theory which has only one free parameter more than 
EU may allow a wide range of patterns and hence be unparsimonious by our 
standard (Gul's (1991) one-parameter disappointment-based theory is an exam- 
ple). 
Comparing Theories with Maximum-Likelihood Error Rate Analysis 
The analyses expressed visually in Figure 2 have two severe shortcomings: 
First, there is no single compelling measure by which to compare theories. 
Second, all the criteria throw away information by collapsing the entire distribu- 
tion of responses into a single number-the proportion of choices consistent 
with a theory. 
Our test overcomes these problems. We characterize a theory as a restriction 
on the proportions of subjects that have true preferences corresponding to each 
of the eight patterns. For example, EU permits two types of subjects, a 
proportion p1 of consistent risk-averters who prefer SSS, and a proportion 
1 - p1 of consistent risk-preferrers who prefer RRR. In previous work (including 
the studies we reanalyze in this paper, some of which are our own), if a subject 
were to choose, say, RRS or SRR, the response was simply counted as inconsis- 
tent with EU. The premise of our test is that systematic variation in unpredicted 
patterns should count against a theory: if many people choose RRS and few 
choose SRR, a theory which predicts nobody will choose either should be 
penalized more heavily. 
Penalizing theories for systematic variation in unpredicted patterns requires 
some allowance for error; otherwise, a single observation of an unpredicted 
pattern would immediately invalidate a theory. Therefore, we allow the possibil- 
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ity of erroneous deviations from underlying preferences so we can judge the 
degree of inconsistency of an observation.9 For example, suppose EU is 
true-people prefer either RRR or SSS-but subjects make random errors 
which are independent and equally likely across the three choices. For those 
subjects with true preference pattern RRR, the patterns which occur because of 
one error (SRR, RSR, and RRS) should be equally likely, and should be more 
likely than the two-error patterns (SSR, SRS, and RSS). For those subjects with 
true preference pattern SSS, the patterns which occur because of one error 
(RSS, SRS, and SSR) should be equally likely and should be more likely than 
the two error patterns (SRR, RSR, and RRS). Thus, EU can be characterized as 
a restriction on allowed patterns (SSS and RRR patterns only), which 
implies-when error is assumed-that some inconsistent patterns are more 
likely than others. By assuming a range of true underlying preferences (re- 
stricted by the theory) and an error rate, each theory makes interconnected 
predictions about the relative frequency of each consistent and inconsistent 
pattern. We can then use the entire distribution of choices to judge a theory, 
rather than simply counting totals of consistent or inconsistent choices, or 
restricting attention to two choices as previous studies have.10 
The BKJ data illustrate how our method works. Fanning out allows four types 
of subjects: Those who choose SSS, RSS, RRS, and RRR. Call the proportions 
of people with each preference p(SSS), p(RSS), p(RRS), and p(RRR). The 
theory predicts that there are no subjects with true preference for SSR, SRS, 
SRR, and RSR, but those patterns can result if people make errors in expressing 
true preferences. Errors occur with probability e, and are independent for each 
choice. For fanning out, Table II shows the patterns which can result for each of 
the true preferences for various numbers of errors, and the resulting likelihood 
function. For example, a RSS-type who makes exactly two errors-which 
happens with probability p(RSS)e2(1 - )-could choose, SRS, SSR, or RRR. 
The total probability of choice RRR is p(SSS)E3 + p(RSS)E2(1 - E) + 
p(RRS)d(I - E)2 + p(RRR)(l - ?)3. For each theory we find values of the true 
pattern proportions and the error rate (restricted to lie between 0 and 0.5) 
which maximize the likelihood of the distribution of responses under each 
theory's restrictions on consistent patterns. 
We assume a single error rate for all three choices for several reasons. First, 
it is a parsimonious and conservative approach to explaining the distribution of 
choice responses. Many researchers have implicitly adopted independent and 
equal errors in statistical tests of choice theories with two pairwise choices. We 
take that underlying model of errors and apply it to data sets with three or more 
9When indifference curves are convex (i.e., preferences are quasi-concave), what we call "errors" 
might be expressions of strict preference for randomization (Machina (1985), Crawford (1988)). We 
show in an unpublished Appendix (available on request) that our tests are equivalent to the proper 
test when indifference curves are convex. 
10 Conlisk (1989) used a similar error rate with two pairs, but didn't make use of the error rate in 
his statistical test. Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) incorporated error 
rates too. 
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TABLE II 
EXAMPLE OF OCCUPATION OF PATTERNS WHEN SUBJECTS MAKE ERRORS: 
FANNING OUT IN BATTALIO, KAGEL, AND JIRANYAKUL 
Consistent 
Pattern Zero Errors One Error Two Errors Three Errors 
SSS SSS RSS,SRS,SSR RRS,RSR,SRR RRR 
RSS RSS SSS,RRS,RSR SRS,SSR,RRR SRR 
RRS RRS SRS, RSS, RRR SSS, SRR, RSR SSR 
RRR RRR SRR,RSR,SRR SSR,SRS,RSS SSS 
Fanning out likelihood function 
[p(SSSX1 -E)3 +p(RSS)E( - E)2 + p(RRS)F2(1 - E) + p(RRR) 3](frequency SSS) x 
[p(SSS)E(l - E)2 + p(RSS)E2(1 - E) +p(RRS)E3 +p(RRR)E 2(1 - s)](frequency SSR) x 
[p(SSS)E(1 _- )2+p(RSS)F2(1 - E) +p(RRS)E(l -_ )2 +p(RRR)F2(1 - E)](frequency SRS) X 
[p(SSS)E2(1 - E)+p(RSS)E3 +p(RRS)F2(1 - E) +p(RRR)E(1 - ,)2](freqUenCY SRR) X 
[p(SSS)e(l -_ )2+p(RSSX1 - E)3 +p(RRS)dl - E)2 +p(RRR)F2(1 - s)](frequencY RSS) X 
[p(SSS)e2(1 - E)+p(RSS)E(1 - E)2 +p(RRS)F2(1 - E) + p(RRR)E(l - s)2](frequency RSR) X 
[p(SSS)e2(1 - E)+p(RSS)E(l - E)2 +p(RRSX1 - F)3 +p(RRR)E(1 - E)2](freqUenCYRRS)x 
[p(SSS)F3 + p(RSS)F2(1 -_ ) + p(RRS)F(l - E)2 + p(RPR)(1 - )3](frequenCY RRR) 
pairwise choices where the same model of errors generates more powerful tests 
of the choice theories. 
Second, allowing error rates to be choice-dependent can lead to nonsensical 
results. For example, having two independent error rates in the two-pair case 
allows EU to explain any observed pattern proportions (leaving zero degrees of 
freedom), and results in negative degrees of freedom for more general theories. 
A middle ground is to make error rates depend on some feature of the 
choice-e.g., how "close" the gambles are (in expected value or in a Euclidean 
metric applied to the triangle diagram), or how costly an error is. The main 
obstacle to doing this well is to develop a theory of decision cost. It is 
inappropriate to assume that an error is less likely in a pair of choices with high 
EV, say, unless EV is the theory being tested. Then the problem of determining 
decision cost becomes recursive: The cost of an error in a particular choice pair 
depends on the theory being tested. We don't think that more complex theories 
(beyond EU, say) will generate strong restrictions on error rates across choices, 
but it would be useful to try. 
Third, theorists have developed alternatives to EU emphasizing structural 
explanations: EU axioms are weakened to encompass a broader set of behaviors 
(additional patterns in this case). Our approach reflects this emphasis by testing 
pattern-based explanations of choice with the simple, restrictive assumption of 
independent and equal errors. Again, another approach is to combine a theory 
of decision cost with less expansive structural explanations.1" Yet another path 
11 Nat Wilcox commented that more sophisticated error explanations may generate related error 
rates that differ for each pairwise choice. Having two independent error rates in the two-pair case 
does generate nonsensical results, but two dependent error rates may be sensible if justified by a 
more sophisticated theory of errors. The hard work of constructing such a theory remains. 
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is to test specific parametric forms of theories and allow choices to be stochastic. 
We think parametric estimation of this sort, with associated error theories, is an 
important direction for further research; Camerer and Ho (in press) and Hey 
and Orme (1993) are a start. Our approach, and the more sharply focused 
parametric approach, are complementary. We test theories in their fullest 
generality; if a theory is rejected using our method, we can safely abandon it. 
The parametric approach, on the other hand, could show that a theory which 
passes our tests is still difficult to specify parsimoniously. For example, we test a 
very general form of prospect theory, which fits reasonably well. Further tests 
are needed to establish whether there is a simple family of probability weighting 
functions-which are central in prospect theory-that also fit well (there 
appears to be; see Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (in press). 
Fourth, we assume errors are independent because we find no form of 
dependence persuasive. If we truly interpret the errors as "error"-like trem- 
bles in noncooperative games-then dependence seems illogical. One can 
imagine alternative assumptions. For example, a thoughtful referee suggested 
an example in which one theory predicts a pattern RR and another predicts RS, 
and the data consist of 1/3 choices of each SS, RR, and RS. Under our 
approach the RS theory predicts best, since it can explain the SS and RR 
choices as only one error away from RS. RR theory predicts poorly because 
RS patterns are one error away but SS patterns are two errors away. We think 
RS should be considered better. To rank the RR and RS theories as equally 
good is to assume that RS and SS deviations from the RR pattern are equally 
likely, which forces us to think of an error as the choice of an entire pattern 
against true preference (rather than a particular choice against preference). 
This route takes us back where many studies started-by simply adding up the 
fraction of unpredicted patterns. Another argument against this route is reduc- 
tio ad absurdum: This path requires us to think that a person who actually 
prefers RR ... RR (n times) is equally likely to err by choosing RR ... RS as by 
choosing SS ... SS. That seems to invoke an unnatural theory of errors. 
Table III shows maximum-likelihood estimates for several theories. For 
example, the estimated fanning out proportions are .320, .072, .327, and .281; 
the estimated error rate is .073. Comparing these estimates with unrestricted 
proportion estimates gives a log likelihood chi-squared statistic (X2) testing the 
goodness-of-fit of the fanning out hypothesis.12 For fanning out, X2 = 1.9 with 
3 degrees of freedom13 (p = .588), so we cannot reject the restriction on true 
pattern proportions imposed by fanning out. 
The maximum-likelihood test is more powerful than the z test described 
above; theories which survive the z test may not survive the maximum-likeli- 
12 That is, the chi-squared statistic tests the hypothesis that the underlying proportions of people 
with preferences for SSR, SRS, SRR, and RSR are zero. Of course, the predicted proportions of 
people exhibiting these four patterns of preference will still be positive because of the error rate. 
13 The number of degrees of freedom for a theory is the number of patterns minus the number of 
linearly independent parameters minus one (so that expected frequencies under the maximum 
likelihood estimates add to the total sample size). 
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TABLE III 
BAT-1ALIo, KAGEL, AND JIRANYAKUL: REAL LOSSES, SERIES 1 
Pattern Observed Fan Fan RD-cave RD-cave RD-vex RD-vex 
123a Frequency EU Out In MF gIE f DE gDE f IE PT 
SSS 7 .435 .320 .435 .283 .295 .339 .349 .309 
SSR 1 0 .026 .023 0 .003 
SRS 1 0 .003 
SRR 1 0 .029 0 .012 .027 
RSS 3 .072 .092 .081 .164 .082 
RSR 0 0 0 0 
RRS 8 .327 .315 .322 .372 .319 1 
RRR 7 .565 .281 .565 .255 .279 .497 .264 .260 0 
n = 28 
Error Rate .209 .073 .209 .038 .059 .183 .095 .056 .357 
Chi-squared Statistic 15.8 1.9 15.8 1.0 1.6 14.4 2.8 1.5 17.2 
Degreesof Freedom 5 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 5 
P Value .007 .588 .001 0 .200 1.5E - 4 .093 .220 .004 
Posterior Odds for EUb 0.03 28.0 2.47 0.65 380 1.17 0.61 2.02 
a Outcomes: -$20,- $12, $0. Probabilities: Sl(.6, .4, 0), Rl(84, 0, 16); S2(0, 1, 0), R2(.6, 0, .4); S3(0, .2, .8), R3(12, 0, .88). 
b Posterior odds for EU against each model under minimal prior information. 
hood test. For example, EU performs well compared to a random-choice 
benchmark: It allows 25% of the possible patterns, and accounts for 50% of 
actual patterns chosen for a z statistic of 3.1. Table III shows, however, that EU 
cannot explain the systematic variation in its inconsistent patterns. EU predicts 
that SRR, RSR, and RRS will all be chosen equally often (the maximum 
likelihood estimates give an expected frequency for each of three patterns of 
2.49), but the observed frequencies for the three patterns are 1, 0, and 8. While 
EU does well by the z test, the chi-squared test shows that EU is unable to 
account for the variation in the inconsistent patterns (p = .007). 
The maximum-likelihood test gives two indications of predictive adequacy 
that aid in diagnosing why some theories fit the data poorly. First, a poor theory 
must invoke a high error rate to explain frequent choice of patterns it did not 
allow. For example, prospect theory allows true patterns of RRS and RRR but 
many subjects chose SSS. A high error rate (.357) is needed to explain why so 
many subjects chose SSS (since the theory interprets the SSS choices as two 
errors by people who truly prefer RRS, or three errors by those who prefer 
RRR). Direct estimates of error rtates, derived by having subjects make the same 
choice twice without realizing it, suggest a natural rate of 15-25% (Starmer and 
Sugden (1989), Camerer (1989), and unpublished data collected by Harless; cf. 
Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul (1990, fn. 13)). Error rates much higher than the 
natural rates, like the .357 estimated for prospect theory, indicate a poor fit. 
Error rates which are much lower, like the .038 estimated from mixed fanning, 
indicate overfitting (i.e., using too many allowed patterns, rather than natural 
error, to explain the distribution of choices). 
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Second, poorly fitting theories have patterns for which the maximum-likeli- 
hood estimate of the true proportion is zero. Such a theory sacrifices parsimony 
with no increase in accuracy. For example, the mixed fan hypothesis allows 
seven of eight patterns in Table III. Coupled with an error rate, that should be 
enough free proportion parameters to exactly fit the observed choices (X2 = 0). 
But it isn't: One pattern probability, p(RSR), is estimated to be zero (its 
unconstrained maximum-likelihood value was negative); the chi-squared statistic 
for mixed-fan is therefore 1.0 and, with no degrees of freedom, its p-value is 
zero. 
The chi-squared test makes the fit-parsimony tradeoff explicit, but does not 
resolve the problem of picking the best theory. Theories with more patterns 
obviously ought to fit better, but how much better must the fit be to justify 
additional proportion parameters? A formal way to evaluate theories with 
different numbers of parameters is the "minimal prior information" posterior 
odds criterion. Klein and Brown (1984) show that when prior information in an 
experiment is minimized (the expected gain in information from the experiment 
is made much larger than the information in the prior) the Bayesian posterior 
odds criterion for Model 1 against Model 2 is [n-(K1-K2)/2] [Maximized Likeli- 
hood under Model 1/Maximized Likelihood under Model 2], where n is the 
sample size and K1 and K2 are the number of free parameters in the two 
models. The second term measures the comparative fit of the two models, while 
the first term adjusts the fit for the difference in dimension of the two models 
and the sample size.14 
The posterior odds for EU against each other theory are shown at the bottom 
of Table III. Fanning out generates the smallest posterior odds (0.03) for EU, 
providing strong evidence against EU. 
Posterior odds is one of several criteria for selecting between models of 
different parsimony. In Section 3 we discuss some other criteria for model 
selection; most of them treat unparsimonious theories less harshly than poste- 
rior odds do. Posterior odds and other model selection criteria also neglect the 
-estimated error rate, which could (in principle) be traded off against fit and 
parsimony. We include posterior odds simply as a suggestion for how fit and 
parsimony might be weighed and to impose consistency on those tradeoffs. 
Table III showed data in which subjects actually suffered a loss (from a stake 
of money given to them initially). Figure 3 and Table IV show results from 
hypothetical choices over the same set of gambles. (In experiments with hypo- 
14 Another formal way to evaluate some of the theories uses nested hypothesis tests. For example, 
the EU restriction on pattern proportions is nested within the fanning out restriction. Where 
hypotheses are nested, the reader can easily undertake such an hypothesis test by subtracting the 
goodness-of-fit chi-squared statistics in the tables. For example, in Table III the chi-squared sta- 
tistic testing the EU restrictions on pattern proportions against the fanning out restrictions is 
(15.8 - 1.9) = 13.9 with (5 - 3) = 2 degrees of freedom; the nested hypothesis test rejects the EU 
restrictions (p = 0.001). We do not report the nested hypothesis tests because they add little 
information beyond the goodness-of-fit statistics and because there are many cases where PT and 
EU are nonnested so the test cannot be applied. 
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FIGURE 3.-Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul: Hypothetical losses, Series 1. 
thetical choices subjects were instructed to choose as if one of their choices 
would be played out for real payoffs.) Comparing the figures provides a glimpse 
of how motivating subjects, by playing one of the gambles they chose, affects 
their choices. Figure 2 (real) and Figure 3 (hypothetical) look similar. Prospect 
theory, fanning out, and RD-vex-f lE are undominated in Figure 2; pros- 
pect theory, fanning out, RD-vex-f IE, and mixed fanning are undominated in 
Figure 3. 
The maximum-likelihood error rate analyses reported in Tables III and IV 
show some subtle differences which are hidden by the figures. Compared to data 
with hypothetical losses (Table IV), the data for real losses (in Table III) have 
lower error rates (except for PT). It appears that paying subjects reduces 
variance (Smith and Walker (1993)). But paying subjects does not increase their 
adherence to EU. Instead, the lower variance in the real-loss data implies that 
EU is rejected with real data (p .007), but fits better with hypothetical data 
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TABLE IV 
BATTALTO, KAGEL, AND JIRANYAKUL: HYPOTHETICAL LOSSES, SERIES 1 
Pattern Observed Fan Fan RD-cave RD-cave RD-vex RD-vex 
123a Frequency EU Out In MF gIE f DE gDE f IE PT 
SSS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SSR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SRS 1 0 0 
SRR 2 0 .063 0 0 .014 
RSS 5 .207 .186 .190 .273 .209 
RSR 3 .088 .048 0 
RRS 6 .225 .247 .238 .406 .226 .406 
RRR 10 1 .568 1 .416 .524 ;727 .594 .551 .594 
n = 27 
Error Rate .284 .130 .284 .055 .111 .180 .204 .123 .204 
Chi-squared Statistic 11.7 2.5 11.7 1.6 2.3 5.6 6.7 2.5 6.7 
Degreesof Freedom 5 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 5 
P Value .039 .476 .009 0 .131 .018 .010 .116 .243 
Posterior Odds for EU 0.27 27.0 24.3 6.6 34.9 60.6 7.3 0.08 
a Outcomes: -$20,- $12, $0. Probabilities: S1(6, .4, 0), R1(.84, 0, 16); S2(0, 1, 0), R2(.6, 0, .4); S3(0, .2,.8), R3(.12, 0, .88). 
(p = .039). (The z statistics paint the opposite, misleading, picture: EU does 
better with real losses, z = 3.1, then hypotheticals, z = 1.4.) 
In Figures 2 and 3 prospect theory dominates EU; both theories allow two 
patterns but prospect theory picks out the two most highly occupied patterns for 
both real losses and hypothetical losses. The error rate analyses show that 
prospect theory generates an excellent fit for the hypothetical losses (Table IV), 
but generates a poor fit-marginally worse than EU-for real losses (Table III). 
Risk preference for losses makes PT as parsimonious as EU, but that parsimony 
comes at too high a price for real losses: the highly occupied SSS pattern is 
excluded. 
2. OTHER CHOICE STUDIES 
In this section we review the results of three other studies. We highlight the 
distinctive features of each study and draw some conclusions. The results of 
these and several other studies are formally aggregated in Section 3. 
Harless 
Harless (1992) examined choices over real gain and real loss lotteries (one 
lottery was played with real payoffs) in common consequence lottery pairs just 
inside the triangle boundary. Some people have suggested that systematic 
deviations from EU disappear in the triangle interior (Conlisk (1989), Camerer 
(1992)). If it is true, this fact is important. A gamble on the boundary has some 
outcomes which have zero probability. Moving off the boundary into the interior 
means that an outcome which had zero probability now has positive probability. 
Therefore, the disappearance of deviations as one moves from the boundary to 
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FIGURE 4.-Harless: Real gains from unit triangle interior. 
the interior suggests the source of the deviations may be nonlinear weighting of 
low probabilities (cf. Neilson (1992b)). 
The conclusion appears to be overstated, at least for gains. The results are 
shown in Figure 4 and Table V for gains, and in Figure 5 and Table VI for 
losses. The tables and figures show the responses of Harless's original subjects 
plus the responses of 38 more subjects.15 
Figure 4 shows the data frontier for gains. The figure is useful for screening 
out RD-cave (z = 0.2) and fanning in (which is dominated by fanning out), but 
does not help distinguish among the other theories. The chi-squared error rate 
analysis in Table V rules out several theories which pass the z test-for 
15 We recruited undergraduates from Wharton as additional subjects (using exactly the same 
procedures as in the original study) to bring the sample size to a level appropriate for the 
chi-squared test. We also gathered additional responses to augment the Chew and Waller (1986) 
data set. The test for the explanatory power of the models over the entire distribution of responses 
requires a larger sample size than the test of models' performance compared to random choice. 
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TABLE V 
HARLESS: REAL GAINS FROM UNIT TRIANGLE INTERIOR 
Pattern Observed Fan Fan 
1357a Frequency EV EU Out In MF RD-cave RD-vex PT 
SSSS 10 .256 .213 .252 .174 .252 .187 .252 
SSSR 2 0 .009 0 0 
SSRS 2 0 
SSRR 4 .010 .053 .010 .010 
SRSS 2 0 
SRSR 1 0 0 0 
SRRS 4 .050 
SRRR 6 0 .083 .094 
RSSS 1 0 0 0 
RSSR 1 0 0 
RSRS 1 0 .002 0 
RSRR 1 0 0 0 
RRSS 10 .173 .147 .150 
RRSR 8 .080 .071 
RRRS 5 0 .057 .019 
RRRR 26 1 .744 .614 .738 .395 .738 .429 .738 
n = 84 
Error Rate .366 .219 .166 .216 .092 .216 .107 .216 
Chi-squared Statistic 59.9 29.2 15.8 29.2 7.1 29.2 8.8 29.2 
Degrees of Freedom 14 13 9 9 2 6 6 10 
P Value 1.2E - 7 .006 .071 .001 .029 5.7E - 5 .186 .001 
Posterior Odds for EU 5.1E + 5 8.6 6,902 5.9E + 5 5.3E + 6 200 753 
a Outcomes: $0, $3, $6. Probabilities: 51(.84, .14, .02), R1(.89, .01, .10); S3k.04, .94, .02), R3(.09, .81, .10); 55(.44, 14, .42), 
R5(.49,.01,.5); S7(04,.14,.82), R7(.09,.01,.9). 
example, EV has the highest z statistic but has the lowest chi-squared p value. 
The conjecture that EU violations disappear in the interior appears to be false, 
since the chi-squared test gives a p value of .006. Nevertheless, no other theory 
accounts for the distribution of non-EU choices parsimoniously. Fanning out, 
mixed fan, and RD-vex have higher p values than EU, but they waste degrees 
of freedom on sparsely occupied patterns. 
The posterior odds ratios favor EU over all competitors, showing that while 
EU is systematically violated, its competitors are no more accurate (adjusting 
for the number of patterns they allow). However, EU has a larger error rate 
than more general theories; if we could trade off error rates with fit and 
parsimony, other theories might look better. For example, RD-vex has a higher 
p value than EU (.186 versus .006) and a lower error rate (.107 versus .219), but 
the posterior odds of EU against RD-vex are 200-to-1. Forcing EU to have a 
lower error rate would shift the odds toward RD-vex.16 Furthermore, the poor 
16 The error rate is always at least as large for EU than for more general theories which include 
EU, but the posterior odds criterion does not penalize EU for its high error rate. Dave Grether 
suggested a way to correct this bias, by computing posterior odds after restricting the error rate to 
be the same for all theories. However, there is no obviously correct way to choose a single rate, or 
estimate one from the data. The reader should keep in mind that the posterior odds we report put 
EU in the best possible light. 
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FIGURE 5.-Harless: Real losses from unit triangle interior. 
absolute fit of EU (p =.006) means there is room for improvement: A theory 
which restricts fanning out, allowing pattern RRSS but ruling out the other 
non-EU patterns, would lead to strong evidence against EU (posterior odds of 
0.01 for EU). 
Figure 5 and Table VI give results for gambles over small losses. Again the z 
statistic can mislead: EU has a higher z statistic for gains (z = 8.4) than losses 
(z = 4.1), but the chi-squared p values are reversed (p = .006 for gains, p = .133 
for losses). In both cases, EU beats all competitors by the posterior odds ratio. 
In the BKJ study prospect theory poorly fit the real loss data from the triangle 
boundary. Here prospect theory poorly fits loss data from the triangle interior 
(Table VI). In both loss studies the R gambles are mean-preserving spreads of 
the S gambles. For border gambles in BKJ, risk preference for losses makes PT 
as parsimonious as EU. For interior gambles in the Harless study, risk prefer- 
ence for losses makes PT nearly as parsimonious as EU. In both cases prospect 
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TABLE VI 
HARLESS: REAL LOSSES FROM UNIT TRIANGLE INTERIOR 
Pattern Observed Fan Fan Mixed 
1357a Frequency EU Out In Fan RD-cave RD-vex PT 
SSSS 10 .430 .430 .229 .201 .232 .297 
SSSR 9 .154 .138 .268 
SSRS 2 0 
SSRR 3 0 0 0 
SRSS 4 0 
SRSR 7 .167 .111 .251 .650 
SRRS 3 0 
SRRR 6 .025 .103 .017 0 
RSSS 1 0 0 0 
RSSR 2 0 0 
RSRS 1 0 0 0 
RSRR 7 .101 0 
RRSS 4 0 .063 .007 
RRSR 6 .057 .004 
RRRS 2 0 0 0 
RRRR 12 .570 .570 .425 .226 .500 .424 .350 
n = 79 
Error Rate .281 .281 .222 .141 .248 .236 .362 
Chi-squared Statistic 18.7 18.7 7.4 3.2 11.3 10.2 22.8 
Degrees of Freedom 13 9 9 2 6 6 12 
P Value .133 .028 .592 .204 .080 .117 .030 
Posterior Odds for EU 6,241 22.5 1.2E + 7 l.E + 5 6.2E + 4 68.2 
a Outcomes: -$4,- $2, $0. Probabilities: S1(.8, .18,'.02), R1(.88, .02, .1); S3(.02, .96, .02), R3(.1, .8, .1); S5(.41, .18, .41), 
R5(.49,.02,.49); S7(.02,.18,.80), R7(.10,.02,.88). 
theory's fit is worse than that of EU because the common pattern SSSS is 
excluded. 
For losses, note that fanning in is the only challenger to EU as a parsimo- 
nious theory that also achieves reasonable fit-in sharp contrast to the fanning 
out for gains in the triangle interior (Table V). Fanning in for losses inside the 
triangle is also prevalent in our reanalysis of data from Camerer (1992). Mixed 
fan can account for both fanning out for gains and fanning in for losses inside 
the triangle, but it fits poorly because it uses too many free parameters to 
explain patterns that are occupied only because of random error.17 
17 In the Harless and BKJ experiments subjects were allowed to respond that they were 
indifferent between two lotteries. For example, in Harless's study using real gain lotteries, in 
addition to the 84 subjects in Table V, there were two subjects that indicated they were indifferent 
between lotteries Si and Ri. Letting I represent indifference, their responses were IRSR and 
ISRR. We exclude such responses from our main analysis, but in footnote 26 we summarize how 
little the results change when indifference responses are included. We assume that the indifference 
response may belong to one of several patterns and assign indifference responses to maximize the 
likelihood function for each theory. For example, for each theory an IRSR response may be 
assigned to the SRSR or RRSR pattern, whichever yields a higher likelihood for the theory. 
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Chew and Waller 
The Chew and Waller (1986) study combines three common consequence 
choices with a common ratio lottery choice, allowing a test of whether indiffer- 
ence curves are linear. Figure 6 and Table VII contain the responses to the 
Chew and Waller hypothetical small gain choices on the triangle boundary 
(their context 1A) for the 56 subjects in their study and 43 new subjects we 
recruited. Figure 6 suggests that violations of EU appear to be due to fanning 
out or convex indifference curves (RD-vex): theories which lack these features 
are generally dominated by theories which have them. 
The figure does not show whether the assumption of parallel indifference 
curves (EU) should be sacrificed for linear indifference curves that fan out 
(WEU-out), general fanning out, or RD-vex, since all those theories have high z 
statistics. The chi-squared test in Table VII provides a definite answer. Fanning 
out fits quite well (p =.087), with fewer patterns than other theories with 
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0 I ORD-cave (-4.0) 
* ORD-cave fDE (-2.0) 
0.3 Fan In (-1.2) 
*WEU In (0.4) 
0. 2 0 *EU (2.5) 
*EV (3.2) 
0.1 
? - 1-1 1 1 1'I -1- 11 h-i lIl I I 
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Number of Consistent Patterns 
Z statistics (in parentheses) test each theory against the random choice null hypothesis. 
FIGURE 6.-Chew and Waller: Hypothetical moderate gains, Context 1A. 


































































































































































































































































































































GENERALIZED EXPECTED UTILITY 1273 
comparably good fits, and has the lowest posterior odds ratio (3.OE - 11, the 
strongest evidence against EU).18 
All the theories that assume linear indifference curves-EV, EU, WEU, 
linear mixed fan (LMF), and implicit EU-fit poorly by the chi-squared test.19 
Chew and Waller (1986) concluded that WEU-out was superior to EU because 
its z statistic was higher. In our analysis (including 43 new subjects), WEU-out 
does provide a much better fit than EU using the chi-squared test and posterior 
odds ratio, but those tests also show that several theories with nonlinear 
indifference curves are even better than WEU-out. 
Table VII shows another way in which the maximum-likelihood error-rate 
analysis is more informative than simply counting pattern frequencies. Nine 
subjects chose pattern SSRS, many more than expected under random choice. 
Fanning out allows that pattern, but its maximum likelihood estimate for the 
proportion of subjects who truly prefer SSRS is zero. Introducing the parameter 
p(SSRS) to the model that already had consistent patterns SSSS, SRRS, RRRS, 
and RRRR did not improve the fit even though SSRS choices were common. 
The estimated proportion of subjects with true SSRS pattern preference is low 
because raising the estimate increases the expected frequencies of neighboring 
patterns (RSRS, SRRS, SSSS, and SSRR), but those expected frequencies 
already exceed observed frequencies. Fanning out could afford to exclude SSRS, 
even though it is chosen often, because it is fed by errors from the SSSS and 
SRRS patterns and therefore has a high expected frequency (6.6) even if SSRS 
is excluded. 
Sopher and Gigliotti 
Sopher and Gigliotti (1990) gathered responses to the Allais Paradox common 
consequence pairs and three other common consequence pairs from the triangle 
boundary (Table VIII). They also gathered responses to comparable choices in 
the triangle interior (Table IX). When lotteries lie in the interior, the 
EV pattern (RRRRR) is chosen much more often. The chi-squared test in 
Table VIII shows that EU has a terrible fit for lotteries on the boundary of the 
triangle (p = 1.5E - 25). EU fits substantially better for interior lotteries, but 
the p value is still low (3.7E - 10). By the posterior odds ratios EU is worse 
than many theories for boundary lotteries (Table VIII) but better than every 
alternative except prospect theory for interior lotteries (Table IX). (In Harless's 
data using interior lotteries, Tables V and VI, EU is better than every other 
theory by the posterior odds ratio.) The success of prospect theory stems from 
increased precision for interior gambles (allowing only 7 of 32 patterns) com- 
18 Becker and Sarin (1987) note that their lottery dependent utility theory accounts for 98-99% 
of the choices by allowing 14 of the 16 possible patterns. But one can account for the distribution of 
responses with far fewer patterns; the posterior odds for fanning out against lottery dependent EU 
are 2.27E + 06. 
19Camerer and Ho (in press) reach a similar conclusion from a review of ten studies testing the 
betweenness axiom (which creates linear indifference curves). 
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pared to boundary gambles (allowing 18 of 32), which serves it well since there 
are fewer systematic patterns with interior gambles.20 
There is another interesting difference between interior and boundary results. 
Fanning out fits better than fanning in for boundary lotteries (Table VIII) and 
the opposite is true for interior lotteries (Table IX). Neither theory fits well for 
both sets of gambles. 
The data provide little reason to replace the independence assumption in EU 
with the weaker assumption of betweenness. The theories which assume be- 
tweenness have high posterior odds supporting EU. The only exception is 
WEU-out on the boundary, but in that case several other theories have even 
better posterior odds than WEU-out. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Tables VIII and IX is the large number 
of maximum likelihood estimates which equal zero. All the generalizations of 
EU are guilty. Under the error rate approach, the distribution of responses may 
be explained with relatively few consistent patterns. EU is too lean (it allows too 
few patterns to explain the distribution); generalizations of EU are too fat (they 
predict too many useless patterns or the wrong ones). 
3. AGGPEGATION OF RESULTS ACROSS STUDIES 
Sections 1 and 2 demonstrate that the error rate analysis of choice data is 
more powerful than statistical tests employed previously. In general, some 
conclusions drawn from earlier studies are reversed by our analyses-e.g., in 
some cases a theory with a high z statistic, which predicts much better than a 
random choice benchmark, cannot account for variation in unpredicted patterns 
and hence is rejected by the chi-squared test while a theory with a lower z 
statistic is not rejected by the chi-squared test. And while EU performs 
relatively better with gambles in the triangle interior (compared to generaliza- 
tions), by our tests it is easily rejected there too. Some new conclusions appear 
too-e.g., paying subjects appears to lower the error rate, increasing rejection 
of EU and many other theories rather than inducing conformity to them. Many 
theories have been proposed to explain violations of EU such as the common 
consequence and common ratio effect. Our method uses the distribution of 
responses across combinations of common consequence and common ratio 
choice problems generating tests with more power showing that some of the 
20 There are some instances, such as the Sopher and Gigliotti data sets, where we do not impose 
restrictions on a theory's parameters across data sets. We take each set of pairwise choices from a 
unit triangle as a separate data set. Since subjects were randomly assigned to either the boundary or 
interior treatment in the Sopher and Gigliotti study, the risk preferences between the two groups 
should be identical. Hence, one could consider adding the restriction for EU that the proportion of 
subjects prefering SSSSS must be the same for lotteries on the boundary and the interior. The other 
instance where cross-data set restrictions could be considered involves gain and loss triangles with 
choice pairs having mean-preserving risk spreads to test prospect theory's reflection effect (Battalio, 
Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990), Camerer (1989,1992)). Since reflection is confirmed in these studies, 
we suspect that imposing the restrictions might make prospect theory fare better and theories not 
incorporating reflection, such as EU, fare worse. We do not impose cross-data set restrictions 
because there is no precise prediction for many of the generalizations of EU. 
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candidate theories cannot explain the distribution of responses while others 
can. Our method clearly demonstrates that some theories are losers as they are 
less parsimonious and have a poorer fit than other theories. The posterior odds 
ratios also provide an unequivocal method for trading off fit and parsimony in 
comparing EV, EU, and the generalizations. (In contrast, analysis based on the 
proportion of consistent responses yields conflicting conclusions for each of 
three measures, difference, inside ratio, and outside ratio.) And the analysis has 
another important advantage: Since the sum of several independent random 
variables with chi-squared distributions also has a chi-squared distribution, 
chi-squared statistics from different experiments may be added to gauge each 
theory's performance across a variety of subjects, investigators, experimental 
methods, and so on, as long as the experiments are independent. Aggregation 
tells us whether deviations from EU are robust across studies. 
The independence of studies is hard to evaluate. For our purposes, indepen- 
dence means that conditional on the truth of a particular theory, a sample of 
results from one experiment did not influence the results from another. Nonin- 
dependence could arise because the same subjects are represented by choices in 
multiple data sets, or because some investigators designed their experiments 
based on earlier results. The amount of design dependence is difficult to 
measure empirically. It is surely substantial because virtually all the studies we 
aggregate used some variation on familiar common consequence, common ratio, 
betweenness-testing, and framing problems introduced by Allais (1953) and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and many used a design adapted from Chew and 
Waller (1986) (proposed initially by Chew and MacCrimmon (1979)). Since we 
cannot measure the degree of dependence between studies reliably, we offer 
two caveats to our aggregation analyses (which assume independence): First, 
violations of independence imply that the p values we compute by adding 
chi-squared statistics are too low; skeptical readers might adjust them upward to 
reflect the degree of dependence they think exists. Second, in many cases a 
single study generates p values low enough to cast severe doubt on one or more 
theories, so even if studies are perfectly dependent (i.e., are pure replications 
which differ only by sampling error) the data are sufficient to reject some 
theories. 
With the caveat about our heavy-handed independence assumption in mind, 
we discuss the result of aggregating different studies. Included in our chi-squared 
aggregation are the results from the seven data sets presented in Sections 2 and 
3 and the results from sixteen more data sets from Battalio, Kagel, and 
Jiranyakul (1990), Camerer (1989,1992), Chew and Waller (1986), and Sopher 
and Gigliotti (1990) presented in an unpublished Appendix (available upon 
request).21 
21 We excluded studies with two-pair patterns. Tests like ours are correct but severely limited 
when applied in a two-choice case (e.g., Conlisk (1989), Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990), 
Prelec (1990)). Two pairs (four patterns) do not span a broad range of gambles, and hence are too 
few to distinguish all the theories we consider. For example, in a two-pair test weighted and implicit 
EU cannot be distinguished, and mixed fanning allows all four patterns. 
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TABLE X 
PERFORMANCE OF THEORIES USING MEASURES BASED 
ON PERCENTAGE CONSISTENT RESPONSES 
Sum of Squared Degrees of Ratio Difference Outside 
Z Statistics Freedom P Value Measure Measure Ratio 
EV 1,432 23 9E - 289 4.14 .17 .81 
EU 1,183 23 2E- 235 3.03 .20 .76 
WEU-Out 599 23 8E - 112 1.89 .22 .66 
WEU-In 383 23 6E - 67 1.61 .14 .78 
LMF 279 23 9E - 46 1.31 .15 .53 
IEU 36 6 3E-06 1.16 .08 .84 
Fan Out 547 23 SE - 101 1.75 .23 .64 
Fan In 308 23 1E - 51 1.45 .13 .80 
MF 291 21 2E- 49 1.25 .16 .41 
RD-cave 155 14 6E - 26 1.27 .12 .78 
RD-cave gIE 247 19 1E- 41 1.33 .16 .67 
RD-cave fDE 242 19 2E - 40 1.31 .14 .72 
RD-vex 118 14 2E- 18 1.22 .12 .73 
RD-vex gDE 79 19 3E - 09 1.13 .06 .86 
RD-vex fIE 129 19 3E - 18 1.21 .10 .77 
PT 627 23 1E- 117 1.73 .24 .57 
Consider first the measures of theory performance based on percentage of 
consistent responses aggregated over all 23 studies (Table X).22 The z statistics 
(comparing each theory's percentage of consistent responses to a random choice 
null hypothesis) are squared (so that they become chi-squared statistics) and 
summed (keeping the sign when theories generate negative z statistics). The 
extreme p values show that each model does much better than would be 
expected if choices were random. This is an important conclusion, but does not 
tell us whether theories fail to account for variation in excluded patterns and 
gives no clear way to choose among theories. Also given in Table X for each 
theory are the ratio measure (the proportion consistent divided by the propor- 
tion of consistent patterns), difference measure (proportion consistent minus 
proportion consistent patterns), and outside ratio (the proportion of inconsis- 
tent responses divided by the proportion of inconsistent patterns) weighted by 
sample size and aggregated over the 23 studies. None of the measures selects 
EU. The difference measure selects PT. The ratio measure selects the most 
parsimonious theory (EV). The outside ratio selects the broadest theory which 
excludes uncommon patterns (mixed fan). Besides having no good reason to 
choose one measure over the others, the measures of theory performance in 
Table X are incomplete because they throw away information about the 
distribution of responses in consistent and inconsistent patterns. 
The sum of chi-squared statistics from the maximum likelihood error analysis 
over all 23 data sets are given in Table XI. All the theories have extremely low p 
22 Even in studies without specific tests of betweenness, WEU-out is tested whenever fanning out 
is tested; hence, the sum of squared z statistics for WEU-out includes squared z statistics for 
fanning out from studies that do not test for betweenness. A similar statement holds for WEU-in, 
rank-dependent theories with elasticity conditions, and LMF. 
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TABLE XI 
SUM OF CHI-SQUARED STATISTICS OVER ALL STUDIES 
Sum of 
Chi-squared Degrees of 
Statistics Freedom P Value 
EV 1,289.0 253 3E- 138 
EU 902.5 243 1E - 76 
WEU-Out 611.6 189 5E-46 
WEU-In* 869.0 189 1E - 87 
LMF* 386.4 96 2E - 36 
IEU* 294.0 50 3E-36 
Fan Out 520.3 175 6E-36 
Fan In* 837.7 175 4E-87 
MF 153.0 58 2E- 10 
RD-cave 289.4 74 3E - 27 
RD-cave gIE 327.3 97 1E - 26 
RD-cave fDE* 340.9 97 7E - 29 
RD-vex* 428.7 74 2E - 51 
RD-vex gDE* 679.1 97 4E - 88 
RD-vex f IE* 548.2 97 4E - 64 
PT 400.9 167 3E-21 
* Theory is dominated by another with a lower chi-squared 
statistic and at least as many degrees of freedom. 
values. Tables X and XI together tell the whole story: each theory performs 
much better than would be expected if choices were random (Table X), but 
there is systematic variation in the patterns they don't predict too (Table XI). In 
Table XI asterisks indicate dominated theories, which fit worse (higher chi- 
squared statistics) and are less parsimonious (fewer degrees of freedom) than 
some other theory. Half of the theories-all variations of RD-vex, RD-cave 
fDE, fanning in, and all the theories incorporating betweenness except WEU 
out-are dominated.23 
Since the results from individual studies in Sections 1 and 2 indicate that 
theories perform quite differently under different conditions (boundary versus 
interior, for example), Table XII decomposes the sum of chi-squared statistics 
by location in the triangle (boundary, interior) and outcomes (large gain, small 
gain, small loss) of gambles used in the studies. (A decomposition of hypotheti- 
23 We also tested the Quiggin (1982,1993) anticipated utility (AU) proposal for rank-dependent 
expected utility, in which f(.S) = .5 and f(p) is concave (convex) below (above) .5. This restriction 
excludes some patterns in the studies reviewed, but even then AU allows many more patterns than 
other theories do. AU cannot be tested in 8 of the 23 studies because it excludes no patterns at all. 
(MF excludes some patterns in 21 of 23 studies. EV, EU, PT, and fanning exclude patterns in all 
23 studies.) Aggregating over the studies that do test AU, AU generates a log likelihood chi-squared 
statistic of 147.7 (df = 55, p = 2.OE - 10). In the menu of best theories in Table XIII, AU would be 
chosen for m < 1.8 and MF would be chosen for 1.8 S m < 2.3 (but this is not surprising because 
AU makes fewer predictions, and hence has fewer degrees of freedom, than MF). Further 
restrictions on the AU f(p) function would make the theory more parsimonious. For example, one 
could restrict the function to be symmetric around .5 (f(p) = 1 - f(l - p)) or require the concave 
and convex portions to satisfy an elasticity condition. The studies described herein are not efficiently 
designed to test AU in the Quiggin form; more sharply-designed studies would be useful. 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GENERALIZED EXPECTED UTILITY 1281 
cal vs. real-payoff results showed no interesting, reliable differences other than 
those noted in Section 1.) For small losses all the studies used mean-preserving 
risk spreads so the predictions of EV and EU are identical (but see footnote 
27). 
Some theories are dominated in nearly every category in Table XII (WEU-in, 
LMF, and IEU). For other theories the decomposition in Table XII reveals 
areas of strength and weakness of theories. As the individual studies suggested, 
whether lotteries lie on the boundary (where lottery supports are different) or 
the interior, (where supports are the same) makes a tremendous difference for 
the performance of EU. On the boundary of the triangle the p values for EU 
are all quite low, and EU fits only slightly better than EV. In the triangle 
interior, however, EU manages a miraculous recovery. 
The boundary-interior distinction also reveals differences in the performance 
of the alternative theories. Fanning out dominates fanning in on the boundary, 
but in the interior fanning in does better for large gains and small losses. 
Further, since violations of EU are less systematic in the triangle interior, 
theories which allow the same number of patterns in the triangle interior as on 
the boundary (all the theories except PT) have a substantial handicap. Neverthe- 
less, there are indications that systematic deviations from EU occur even in the 
triangle interior (for example, in the Harless and Sopher and Gigliotti data sets) 
so there may be room for leaner generalizations to improve upon EU even in 
the triangle interior. 
The boundary and interior classification proves quite useful as a diagnostic 
tool for prospect theory. For small gains and small losses on the boundary of the 
triangle PT achieves a good fit (except for BKJ real losses in Table III); because 
the riskier lotteries are (usually) mean preserving risk spreads of the safer 
lotteries, PT's property of risk aversion for gains and risk preference for losses 
(except for small probabilities) makes it quite parsimonious. (For small losses 
PT has just one fewer degree of freedom than EU.) For small gains and small 
losses in the triangle interior lotteries are again (usually) mean preserving, but 
PT has an awful fit. The data therefore provide evidence against reflection-risk 
aversion for gains and risk preference for losses-when lottery supports are the 
same.24 Large gains lotteries are not mean preserving, so PT is not very 
parsimonious; it wastes degrees of freedom on useless patterns and its fit is 
undistinguished. However, for large gains in the interior PT allows fewer 
patterns than on the boundary, making it almost as parsimonious as fanning out 
or WEU; there it fits relatively well. 
Table XII also suggests the possibility that curvature of indifference curves 
may depend on the size of outcomes: RD-cave dominates RD-vex for large 
gains but is dominated by RD-vex for small gains and small losses. Although the 
chi-squared statistics differ by orders of magnitude, the effect may be due to 
24 Note that all the experiments which used real-loss payoffs actually deducted losses from an 
initial stake subjects had been given. If subjects frame these lotteries as choices over net gain 
outcomes, the reflection effect predicted by prospect theory is diluted. However, reflection is 
apparent in boundary lotteries with different support. 
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differences in the locations of the lottery pairs. The possibility that curvature 
depends on the size of outcomes deserves further investigation. 
The decomposition in Table XII is informative, but the central question of 
the paper remains: Which alternative to EU competes with EU as the best, 
parsimonious model? 
A large statistical literature on model selection criteria gives guidance on 
trading off fit (chi-squared) and parsimony (degrees of freedom). Many of these 
criteria are described by the rule "pick the model for which X2 - m(degrees of 
freedom) is smallest," where the multiplier m penalizes the use of free parame- 
ters. The number m is a marginal rate of substitution between chi-squared and 
degrees of freedom, or the price of precision. 
Various authors have proposed values for m. The Klein and Brown minimal 
information posterior odds criterion corresponds to the Schwarz criterion (1978) 
m = log n, where n is the sample size. Others have proposed model selection 
criteria with smaller multipliers, such as the Akaike criterion, m = 2 (Akaike 
(1973)), the local Bayes factor, m = 3/2 (Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980)), m = 1 
(Nelder and Wedderburn (1972)), the posterior Bayes factor, m = log (2) = .69 
(Aitkin (1991)), and the simple maximum likelihood criterion, m = 0. 
The range of values for m indicates substantial controversy over how to trade 
off fit and parsimony. We are reluctant to recommend a value of m, but we can 
impose consistency on the reader's selection of m. Return to Table XII. For 
each generalization of EU we give the minimum value of m that would lead to 
the selection of EU over that generalization. For example, for large gains on the 
boundary of the triangle, the minimum m value to select EU over PT is 9.2; if 
the reward for degrees of freedom is less than 9.2 then PT should be selected 
over EU. The reader is invited to reflect on his or her preferences for 
parsimony, ponder the statisticians' advice on appropriate m values, and choose 
an m.25 
The reader selecting an m value high enough to choose EU over all the 
generalizations faces a dilemma, however. In Table XII we also give [in 
brackets] the value of m that leads to selection of EV over EU. For large gains 
on the boundary of the triangle, for example, EV is selected over EU for an m 
value of 7.4 or higher. The EV-EU fit-parsimony comparison provides the most 
damning evidence against EU: on the triangle boundary a value of m high 
enough to lead to the selection of EU over all the generalizations necessarily 
implies the selection of EV over EU. The reader who highly prizes parsimony 
must choose EV over EU when the supports of the lotteries are different. 
However, in the triangle interior (where supports are the same) there are 
reasonable m values for which EU should be selected over the generalizations 
and also over EV. 
Table XIII provides a compact summary of the results of all the studies. For 
each of the classifications in Table XII, we show the menu of best, parsimonious 
25 On the boundary of the triangle the Schwarz criterion multiplier values are 6.3 for large gains, 
small gains 5.4, and small losses 4.8. In the triangle interior the Schwarz criterion multiplier values 
are 6.3 for large gains, small gains 5.5, and small losses 5.5. 
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TABLE XIII 
THE BEST THEORIES FOR VALUES OF THE MULTIPLIER ASSIGNED 
TO DEGREES OF FREEDOM (m) 
Boundary of Unit Triangle (Lotteries with Different Support) 
Large Gains Small Gains Small Losses 
m Value Best Theory m Value Best Theory m Value Best Theory 
m <4.3 MF m <0.5 MF m <0.8 MF 
4.3 < m < 7.7 RD-cave f DE 0.5 < m < 0.8 RD-vex 0.8 < m < 1.9 RD-vex 
7.7<m < 10.4 Fan Out 0.8 Am < 3.2 Fan Out 1.9 Am < 13.5 PT 
10.4 < m < 14.7 WEU Out 3.2 < m < 6.1 PT 13.5 < m EU/EV 
14.7<m EV 6.1 Am EV 
Interior of Unit Triangle (Lotteries with Same Support) 
Large Gains Small Gains Small Losses 
m Value Best Theory m Value Best Theory m Value Best Theory 
m < 1.2 RD-cave m <0.8 MF m <0.7 MF 
1.2<m<4.2 PT 0.8 <m<1.1 RD-vex 0.7<m<2.2 FanIn 
4.2 < m < 80.3 EU 1.1 < m < 1.8 Fan Out 2.2 < m EU/EV 
80.3 Am EV 1.8 Am <30.7 EU 
30.7<m EV 
All Studies 
m Value Best Theory 
m<2.3 MF 
2.3<m<6.6 PT 
6.6 < m < 38.6 EU 
38.6 < m EV 
theories depending on the multiplier m attached to degrees of freedom. For all 
the studies combined the menu is (in order of increasing taste for parsimony): 
Mixed fanning, prospect theory, EU, and EV.26'27 
A theory on one of the Table XIII menus has passed a more rigorous test 
than simply being undominated. For example, EU is never dominated, but it is 
never selected as the best model when lottery supports are different. EU is 
selected for a broad range of m values for lotteries in the interior of the triangle 
(where lottery supports are the same); the Schwarz criterion selects EU in every 
case in the interior. Nevertheless, even in the triangle interior EU's perfor- 
mance is not beyond reproach; EU's p value for large gains is small, and in 
some cases EU is only the best theory when the multiplier values are large. A 
26 The results are changed very little if indifference responses from the BKJ and Harless studies 
are included (see footnote 17). If each indifference response is assigned to maximize the likelihood 
function for each individual theory, then the menu of best theories over all studies is: MF for 
m < 2.4, PT for 2.4 < m < 6.6, EU for 6.6 < m < 38.7, and EV for 38.7 < m. 
27 EV may also be interpreted as predicting equal pattern proportions for studies with mean-pre- 
serving spread choices (see footnote 6). Aggregated over all studies, this interpretation of EV 
generates a chi-squared statistic of 1502.7 with 129 degrees of freedom for a p value of 1E - 166. In 
Table XIII the values of m at which EV becomes best are: 14.7,5.6,8.0 (boundary), 80.3,15.0, 15.7 
(interior), and 16.7 instead of 38.6 (all studies). 
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refinement of prospect theory or a new theory which captured the boundary- 
interior differences could come within striking distance of EU even in the 
triangle interior.28 The m value menu provides no support for betweenness as a 
middle ground between independence and nonlinear indifference curves: stick 
by independence (EV on the boundary, EU in the interior) or abandon 
independence and its weaker cousin betweenness for, say, prospect theory. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Daniel Bernoulli resolved the St. Petersburg Paradox by replacing mathemati- 
cal expectation with moral expectation. But Nicholas Bernoulli, who formulated 
the St. Petersburg paradox, never accepted his cousin's solution, believing that 
there should be a single fair price for the game. As Stigler (1950) writes, 
economists may find it surprising that Nicholas Bernoulli and eighteenth cen- 
tury mathematicians believed that the St. Petersburg Paradox could only be 
"solved" by finding a single price for the game. Might future economists find it 
peculiar that twentieth century economists held firmly to EU in the face of the 
Allais paradox and other violations? Stigler's analysis of the development of 
utility theory through the beginning of this century leads him to three criteria 
for successful theories: generality, congruence with reality (or fit, in our terms), 
and manageability. We mention each of these criteria in summarizing the main 
points of this paper. 
There have been many experimental studies comparing EU with competing 
theories of decision making under risk. Many of these studies use a similar 
format: Subjects are given several pairwise choices between choices (for exam- 
ple, picking the riskier gamble from one pair implies picking the riskier gamble 
in another pair). Various theories can then be cast as predictions about patterns 
of choices that should be observed. We note two important features of our 
approach: First, our goal is to discriminate among theories which attempt to 
describe actual choices; we have nothing to say about the normative appeal of 
EU or its generalizations. Second, the generalizability of our results is limited to 
the extent that naturally-occurring choices are different from lotteries with 
well-specified probabilities of monetary outcomes. 
We conducted analyses of 23 data sets containing nearly 8,000 choices and 
2,000 choice patterns, and aggregated the results. We draw several specific 
conclusions. 
(1) All the theories are rejected by a chi-squared test. For every theory there 
is systematic variation in excluded patterns which could, in principle, be ex- 
plained by a more refined theory. 
28As explained in footnote 7, we do not include prospective reference theory (PRT) in the main 
analysis because none of the studies included here adequately test the predictions of the theory. It is 
notable that PRT coincides with EU for choices between gambles in the triangle interior, where EU 
predicts most accurately, but not for boundary gambles for which EU predicts poorly. PRT 
illustrates how capturing the boundary-interior distinction can improve the predictive utility of a 
theory. If we were to include PRT in the menus in Table XIII, PRT would not appear on any of the 
menus for gambles on the boundary of the triangle (PRT is dominated for large gains and for small 
gains). But since PRT is identical to EU in the interior, over all studies PRT would be selected over 
PT for m > 4.4 and EU would be selected over PRT for m > 9.3. 
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(2) There is room for improvement in two directions. Some theories, like EU 
and WEU, are too lean: They could explain the data better by allowing a few 
more common patterns. Other theories, such as mixed fanning and rank-depen- 
dent EU, are too fat: They allow a lot of patterns which are rarely observed. 
Our analyses provide theorists with a way to diagnose empirical shortcomings of 
current theories, and perhaps inspiration for new theorizing. 
(3) There are dramatic differences between theory accuracy when the gambles 
in a pair have different support (they lie on the triangle boundary) and when 
they have the same support (they lie in the triangle interior). EU predicts poorly 
when support is different, and predicts well when support is the same. The 
transition from the boundary to the interior implies adding support, typically a 
small probability of an outcome. Therefore, the accuracy of EU in the interior 
and its inaccuracy on the boundary suggests that nonlinear weighting of small 
probabilities is empirically important in explaining choice behavior. This conclu- 
sion has been suggested before, but is confirmed dramatically by our analysis. 
Indeed, Morgenstern (1979) himself accepted that EU had limited applicability 
when probabilities were low: 
"Now the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, as any theory, is only an approxima- 
tion to an undoubtedly much richer and far more complicated reality than that which the 
theory describes in a simple manner. 
...one should now point out that the domain of our axioms on utility theory is also 
restricted. Perhaps we should have pointed that out, instead of assuming that this would 
be understood ab ovo. For example, the probabilities used must be within certain 
plausible ranges and not go to 0.01 or even less to 0.001, then to be compared with other 
equally tiny numbers such as 0.02, etc. Rather, one imagines that a normal individual 
would have some intuition of what 50:50 or 25:75 means, etc." (Morgenstern (1979, p. 
178).) 
(4) The broadest conclusion of our analysis is that there are some losers 
among competing theories, and some winners. Losers include general theories 
which rely on betweenness rather than independence, and theories which 
assume fanning in throughout the triangle; those theories are dominated by 
other theories which use fewer free parameters and are more accurate. There is 
some irony here: Some of the theories we test were developed after theorists 
had seen some of the data sets-these include mixed fan (which we concocted), 
linear mixed fan or disappointment-aversion theory, lottery dependent utility, 
etc. It is clear that the development of linear mixed fanning, say, was influenced 
by data we use to test linear mixed fan. Instead of presenting a problem, the 
results testify to the power of our approach: We are able to reject some theories 
using the same data which were taken as inspiration, or support, for developing 
the theory in the first place. 
We cannot declare a single winner among theories-much as we cannot 
declare a best ice cream or university-because the best theory depends on 
one's tradeoff between parsimony and fit. But s-appose a researcher can specify 
a single parameter expressing the price of precision, or the reduction in 
goodness-of-fit (measured by a chi-squared statistic) necessary to justify allowing 
an extra free parameter. (Some statistical criteria suggest what this price should 
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be.) We construct a menu of theories which are best at each price-of-precision; 
researchers can then use the menu to decide which theory to adopt, depending 
on the price they are willing to pay. 
When lotteries have different support, there is never a price-of-precision 
which justifies using EU; anyone who values parsimony enough to use EU over 
all the generalizations should use EV instead of EU. Combining all the studies 
(see the bottom of Table XIII), the menu of best theories is: mixed fanning, 
prospect theory, EU, and EV. Statistical criteria suggest various prices of 
precision which favor either mixed fanning or EU; the middle ground between 
high and low prices favors prospect theory. 
We cannot give a more definitive answer to the question of which theory is 
best because people use theories for different purposes. A researcher interested 
in a broad theory, to explain choices by as many people as possible, cares less 
for parsimony and more for accuracy; she might choose mixed fanning or 
prospect theory. A decision analyst who wants to help people make more 
coherent decisions, by adhering to axioms they respect but sometimes wander 
from, might stick with EU or EV. A mathematical economist who uses the 
theory as a brick to build theories of aggregate behavior may value parsimony 
more highly; she might choose EU or EV (though she should never use EU 
when choices involve gambles with different support). 
However, an historical parallel described by Stigler (1950) may be instructive 
for those who cling to EU: 
"Economists long delayed in accepting the generalized utility function because of the 
complications in its mathematical analysis, although no one (except Marshall) questioned 
its realism ... Manageability should mean the ability to bring the theory to bear on specific 
economic problems, not ease of manipulation. The economist has no right to expect of 
the universe he explores that its laws are discoverable by the indolent and the unlearned. 
The faithful adherence for so long to the additive utility function strikes one as showing at 
least a lack of enterprise" (Stigler (1950, pp. 393-394).) 
The pairwise-choice studies suggest that violations of EU are robust enough 
that modeling of aggregate economic behavior based on alternatives to EU is 
well worth exploring. So far there have been relatively few such efforts.29 
Ultimately, most of the payoff for economics will come from replacing EU in 
models of individual behavior with more accurate descriptive principles or a 
single formal theory. Our results suggest which replacements are most promis- 
ing, and which modifications of the currently available theories are most 
productive. 
We see our paper as summarizing a chapter in the history of empirical studies 
of risky choice. We think the weight of evidence from recent studies with 
multiple pairwise choices, when aggregated across those studies, is sufficiently 
great that new pairwise-choice studies are unlikely to budge many basic conclu- 
sions-the statistical value-added of more such studies is low (compared to the 
29 Epstein (1990) reviews some recent efforts by economists. 
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value-added of new approaches). However, this sweeping conclusion leans 
heavily on the assumption that different studies are completely independent 
(which they likely are not). If studies are highly dependent then our results are 
overstated, and there may still be substantial value in using the pairwise-choice 
paradigm to exploring new domains of gambles (e.g., gambles over losses, 
gambles with many possible outcomes, gambles with very low probabilities); 
more data could change the way at least some theories are ranked. 
If our analysis closes the chapter on pairwise-choice empirics (or summarizes 
the much that we know so far), then it opens new chapters as well-particularly, 
a chapter devoted to combining structural explanations of choice problems with 
more sophisticated theories of errors. Empirical studies fitting individual non-EU 
functions and parameters to subjects are useful and relatively rare (see Daniels 
and Keller (in press), Hey and Di Cagno (1990), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). 
Studies that test axioms directly-e.g., Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1993) test 
comonotonic independence, the crucial ingredient in rank-dependent ap- 
proaches-are useful too. Function-fitting, and our approach, both allow het- 
erogeneous preferences. (The fact that estimated pattern proportions are fairly 
even across patterns suggest there is substantial heterogeneity.) For analytical 
tractability, it is often useful to assume homogeneity (in representative-agent 
models); then the sensible empirical question is which single theory, and which 
precise parameter values, fits everyone's choices best (see Camerer and Ho (in 
press)). 
Finally, our general method could be applied in other domains. For example, 
various noncooperative solution concepts permit different sets of choices in 
games. Theories could be characterized as restrictions on allowable patterns of 
choices, and the distribution of patterns could be explicitly connected through 
an error rate. For example, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) apply a similar error 
theory to fit various equilibrium concepts to experimental data on the 
"centipede" game, and to test restrictions imposed by different concepts; 
El-Gamal and Grether (1993) apply a similar analysis to experimental data on 
probability judgments. Most importantly, our method would allow one to judge 
which concepts, like Nash equilibrium or its various refinements (and coarsen- 
ings), best trade off parsimony and accuracy. A similar method could be applied 
to compare solution concepts in cooperative games. The discussion above shows 
how our method uses more information and hence is more powerful than 
methods which judge theories only by the percentage of consistent responses 
(e.g., Selten (1987)). 
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